<$BlogRSDUrl$>

My personal musings about anything that gets on my radar screen--heavily dominated by politics.

2004-03-25

More On Clarke

I've tried not to get too worked up over Dick Clarke. This letter by Rep. Christopher Shays, courtesy of Powerline, reassures me that I took the right tack.

As Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee's National Security Subcommittee, I want to provide some information relevant to testimony today by Mr. Richard Clarke.

Before September 11, 2001, we held twenty hearings and two formal briefings on terrorism issues. Mr. Clarke was of little help in our oversight. When he brief the Subcommittee, his answers were both evasive and derisive. He said a comprehensive threat assessment, as recommended by GAO, was too difficult.

Mr. Clark said it would be "silly" to try to articulate a national strategy. In lieu of a threat assessment or strategy, he offered a laundry list of terrorist groups, as if the fight against global terrorism were nothing more than a hunt for common criminals.

Clark was part of the problem before September 11 because he took too narrow a view of the terrorism threat. His approach was reactive and limited to swatting at the visible elements of al Qe'ada, not the hidden global network and its state sponsors.

The blind spots and vulnerabilities that contributed to the September 11, 2001 tragedy were apparent to many throughout the years Mr. Clarke was in a position to do something about them. Three national commissions - Bremer, Gilmore, and Hart-Rudman - had concluded the U.S. needed a comprehensive threat assessment, a national strategy and a plan to reorganize the federal response to the new strategic menace of terrorism.

Yet no truly national strategy to combat terrorism was ever produced during Mr. Clarke's tenure. Instead, several presidential directives and a Justice Department five-year law enforcement plan were clumsily lashed together and called a strategy.

After his uninformative briefing, we wrote to Mr. Clarke asking for written answers to specific questions: Why was there no threat assessment? When would there be a strategy? Who was responsible for coordinating federal spending and the federal response? We never got a satisfactory answer. A copy of our letter to Mr. Clarke is enclosed [included on the link with Shays' letter].

On January 22, 2001, the Subcommittee wrote to Dr. Condoleeza Rice to express our concerns about Mr. Clarke's narrow view of the terrorist threat and the urgency of mounting a strategic response. A copy of that letter is enclosed as well [also included on the link with Shays' letter].

I hope the Commission finds this information useful.

I didn't have the time or the stomach to watch all of Clarke's testimony, but he really comes off as a self-important, megalomaniacal bureaucrat who grew altogether too comfortable with his role in the scheme of things and could not stand being put out of the power circles. And his own words are coming back to haunt him and make him seem sad--almost pathetic.
Posted by: Michael / 3/25/2004 11:37:00 PM

Weblog Commenting by HaloScan.com

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?